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Abstract 
As telecommunication technologies evolve, security 
in communications becomes a more and more relevant 
issue. IPSec is a set of protocols aiming to enhance 
security at the IP layer. Specifically, IPSec and IKE 
are important security mechanism that provide 
cryptographic-based protection for IP packets, and 
consequently for IP services. SCTP is a standardized 
transport protocol whose main features include 
multihoming and multistreaming, and is gaining 
momentum as a general-purpose transport protocol. 
While the simultaneous use of these two protocols is 
feasible, it is under study how to make them work 
efficiently. In this paper, we present a simple method to 
improve SCTP-IPSec-IKE compatibility by modifying 
the structure of the Security Associations. Despite the 
conceptual simplicity of our proposal, it has not been 
proposed before in related literature.  
1. Introduction 
Security concerns are still a hot topic in current 
communications network research. On the one hand, 
IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) [1] is a security 
protocol at the IP layer aiming to protect upper layers 
information and IP header fields from unauthorized 
access. Before the IPSec secure communication is 
established, both entities should agree on what security 
parameters and protocols will be used. IKE (Internet 
Key Exchange) [2] offers a secure and transparent 
method to carry out this negotiation, and it is usually 
employed together with IPSec. On the other hand, 
SCTP (Stream Control Transmission Protocol) [3] is a 
transport protocol no longer exclusive for telephone 
signaling, but it is becoming more and more used as a 
general purpose data transport protocol. In 
heterogeneous network environments, it is usual to 
suggest the use of IPSec to protect SCTP 
communications [4], and so does in wireless 
communications using mobile IP [5]. 
The combined use of these elements, IKE, IPSec, 
and SCTP, implies some drawbacks. Briefly, IPSec 
was not designed to be compatible with multihoming. 
To tackle this problem, several approaches have been 
proposed. For instance, security could be provisioned 
by means of TLS (Transport Layer Security), but the 
delay introduced in SCTP/TLS communications is 
much longer than with SCTP/IPSec as demonstrated in 
[6]. Another idea is to modify the SCTP protocol itself 
to incorporate security, as proposed in [7] [8]. Proposal 
from [7] may suffer from a high loss probability in 
wireless networks. In [8], authors introduced an 
enhanced version of [7], using a collaborative approach 
to improve the transmission performance, and 
obtaining good results. However, IPSec can provide 
security at the network layer without the need to change 
the SCTP protocol. The RFC3554 [9] shows the 
specifications for an IPSec implementation able to 
work properly with SCTP. Nevertheless, from our 
point of view, the implementation detailed in [9] can be 
improved in order to really benefit from all SCTP 
characteristics, especially from multihoming. 
In this paper we propose an enhanced IPSec-IKE 
implementation partially based on the theoretical 
specifications proposed in [9], designed to work with 
SCTP in a transparent way. This enhancement allows 
two SCTP endpoints to use any IP address within a 
pool of IP addresses (e.g. IP addresses within the same 
network) keeping the same IPSec security terms. 
During the IKE negotiation phase, each endpoint will 
communicate its available IP addresses (single ones or 
from a pool). The main advantage lies on the fact that 
endpoints can use different IP addresses during the 
communication (multihoming) but IPSec requirements 
do not need to be set for every IP address in use. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II describes the main features of IKE, IPSec, 
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and SCTP, remarking compatibility issues. Next, 
Section III presents the proposed IPSec and IKE 
implementations, and shows the experimental tests 
carried out. Finally, we include the most relevant 
conclusions derived from this study in Section IV. 
2. Protocols overview 
In this section we present a brief introduction to the 
main characteristics of IKE, IPSec, and SCTP, as well 
as potential compatibility drawbacks. 
2.1. IKE 
One of the main characteristics of IPSec is that 
communication entities can negotiate security 
protocols, ciphering algorithms, and cryptographic 
keys to define a Security Association (SA), and the 
current standard to carry out this negotiation is IKE. A 
Security Association is a unidirectional relationship 
between a sender and a receiver, which offers specific 
security services to all traffic belonging to this relation. 
An IPSec Security Association is defined by the tuple 
{SPI, destination address, security protocol}. The SPI 
is a unique local index required if different SAs exist 
per destination address. The security protocol may be 
either AH or ESP as we will seen later. 
The negotiation protocol IKE is a hybrid that takes 
characteristics from the key exchange protocols Oakley 
[10] and SKEME (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism 
for Internet) [11], and operates within the framework 
provided by the ISAKMP (Internet Security 
Association and Key Management Protocol) [12]. IKE 
is based on a two-phase negotiation. During the first 
phase, parameters needed to set an ISAKMP Security 
Association are negotiated. Six messages are 
exchanged in this phase: first two messages to chose 
the parameters of the ISAKMP SA, next two messages 
to exchange keying material (including nonces to avoid 
replay attacks), and last two messages for 
authentication. There is another option available for the 
first phase, called aggressive mode. However, it does 
not include identity protection, thus it was not selected 
for this work. During the second phase, the agreed 
upon ISAKMP SA is used to secure next exchange 
between entities. In this second phase, entities negotiate 
security parameters for an IPSec Security Association. 
To do so, three messages are used. The first message 
includes an IPSec SA proposal (IPSec protocol, SPI, 
and security algorithms). With the second message, the 
receiver accepts the IPSec SA proposal. The third 
message confirms that the IPSec SA is in use and will 
be employed to secure all IP data exchange from now 
on. Fig. 1 represents the complete process. 
Each ISAKMP message has a fixed header format 
followed by one or more payloads (see Fig. 2). Defined 
payloads are: Security Association, Proposal, 
Transform, Key Exchange, Identification, Certificate, 
Certificate Request, Nonce, etc. Fig. 3 shows a generic 
payload header. For instance, the Identity payload (Fig. 
4) contains DOI-specific data used to exchange 
identification information. This information is used for 
determining the identities of communicating peers, and 
may be used for determining authenticity of 
information. We will use this payload, as we will show 
later, in order to communicate the peer entity available 
IP addresses for multihoming. 
Figure 1. Process of establishing an IPSec Security 
Association. 
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Figure 2. ISAKMP header. 
  4 bytes 
Next Payload Reserved Payload Length 
Figure 3. Generic payload header. 
ISAKMP SA 
Secure communication: Negotiation of 
IPSec SA parameters 
Non-secure communication: Negotiation 
of ISAKMP SA parameters 
IPSec SA 
Secure communication: IP packets 
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4 bytes 
Next Payload Reserved Payload Length 
ID Type DOI specific ID Data 
Identification Data 
Figure 4. Identity payload. ID Type spedifies the type 
of  identification being used. DOI specific ID Data 
contains DOI specific Identification data. 
Identification Data (variable length) contains identity 
information. 
2.2. IPSec 
IPSec comprises three protocols: two security 
protocols (AH, Authentication Header and ESP, 
Encapsulation Security Payload), and a third protocol 
(IKE, Internet Key Exchange) aimed to safely 
exchange security communication parameters between 
endpoints. AH provides authentication, ESP provides 
encryption and optionally authentication, and IKE is an 
implementation of ISAKMP methodology modified to 
provide a higher security level. Security parameters of 
an IPSec one-way communication are stored in a SA. 
Hence, a communication between two endpoints 
requires two SA at each endpoint. Every time a packet 
needs to be processed, IPSec is addressed to the SA in 
order to check security requirements and parameters. 
All SA are in turn stored in a SA Database (SAD). 
2.3. SCTP 
SCTP, initially designed for telephone signaling, has 
become a general purpose transport protocol due to its 
innovative characteristics. The initiation procedure of 
this protocol uses a 4-steps cookie exchange 
mechanism, which grants immunity to flood attacks. 
Multistreaming allows transmission of several data 
streams within the same communication, splitting the 
application data into multiple streams that have the 
property of independently sequenced delivery, so that 
message losses in any one stream will only initially 
affect delivery within that stream, and not delivery in 
other streams. This is achieved by making independent 
data transmission and data delivery. SCTP uses a 
Transmission Sequence Number (TSN) for data 
transmission and detection of message losses, and also 
a Stream ID/Stream Sequence Number pair, which is 
used to determine the sequence of delivery of received 
data. Therefore in reception, the endpoint can continue 
to deliver messages to the unaffected streams while 
buffering messages in the affected stream until 
retransmission occurs. 
The SCTP heartbeat mechanism allows endpoints to 
know the availability of each other, thus preventing 
unnecessary sends. At regular intervals, a heartbeat 
packet is sent to the remote IP addresses, so the source 
knows if a remote IP address is active or inactive. 
There is a counter for each remote IP address that 
counts how many times a heartbeat packet does not 
reach that remote IP address. If the counter exceeds a 
maximum value then the remote IP address changes to 
inactive and the SCTP protocol uses one of the 
alternative addresses. 
Finally, multihoming allows each endpoint to use 
several IP addresses associated with the same 
communication, thus a session can remain active even 
in the presence of network failures. One of the main 
advantages is that in a conventional single-homed 
session, the failure of a local LAN access can isolate 
the end system, but with multi-homing, redundant 
LANs can be used to reinforce the local access. 
Observe that multi-homing is not used for redundancy. 
One of the IP addresses is selected as primary, and it 
will be used as destination in a normal transmission. If 
the heartbeat mechanism (monitoring function) detects 
that a route is not longer available, then another IP 
address is used as destination. 
Dynamic address reconfiguration [13] is a step 
forward. It is a new feature that allows SCTP to use IP 
addresses not previously declared for the current 
communication. This feature becomes especially 
interesting in mobile communications, where IP 
addresses change dynamically. However, security 
issues arise when trying to apply this scheme with 
IPSec. Indeed, the use of IPSec with dynamic address 
reconfiguration SCTP implies, so far, the renegotiation 
of the IPSec SA parameters, i.e. the old tunnel is no 
longer available and a new one should be set up. 
2.4. SCTP-IPSec compatibility 
Essentially, the inconsistency between SCTP and 
IPSec can be described as follows: SCTP multihoming 
is not directly supported by using one-way IPSec SA. 
The reason is clear. An IPSec SA is univocally 
identified by the tuple {SPI, destination address, 
security protocol}. That is, one destination address for 
each SA. Thereby, multihoming is not included by 
definition. First approach to overcome this situation is 
creating as many SA as IP address are allowed by the 
SCTP endpoints. Nevertheless, taking into account new 
features for SCTP such as dynamic address resolution, 
this is not a viable solution. It is not feasible making 
SA if IP addresses are not even known. 
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A solution to this problem is presented in [9]. It 
proposes modifying the structure of the SA so that it 
can manage more than one IP address. Then, a SA is 
able to store several individual IP addresses, hereby, 
giving support to SCTP multihoming. The SAD usually 
saves these addresses within a SA in the form of a 
linked list (Fig. 5). However, this approach will likely 
experience a delay in the processing time required to 
check the SA parameters. Certainly, if the endpoint 
uses a secondary IP address, the remote endpoint needs 
to search the corresponding linked list of the SA in the 
SAD to verify if the new IP address in use is included. 
In next section we present an easy way to enhance this 
behavior. 
3. Improving IPSec-SCTP interaction 
In this section we discuss our proposal to improve 
SCTP-IPSec interaction, and show an experimental 
implementation with satisfactory results. 
3.1. Operation 
To enhance SCTP-IPSec compatibility, we propose 
a simple further step, allowing each SA to store a 
complete range of IP addresses, i.e. a pool of IP 
addresses, even if the terminal initially only uses one of 
them. 
The operation of this method is presented in Fig. 6. 
Assume we establish a secure SCTP connection, using 
IPSec, between two endpoints, A and B, located in 
different networks. A has two IP addresses: IPA1
192.0.1.65/26, and IPA2 192.0.1.66/26. B has also two 
IP addresses: IPB1 192.0.2.65/26, and IPB2
192.0.2.66/26. In order to establish a secure SCTP 
communication via IPSec, we need two SA (one for 
each direction) called SAAB and SABA. Lets us compare 
the SA following the approach described in [9] or using 
our proposal (for instance with the ESP security 
protocol): 
- From [9], the SAAB is described by {11, 
{192.0.2.65, 192.0.2.66}, ESP}, and the SABA
is described by {4, {192.0.1.65, 192.0.1.66}, 
ESP}. See Fig.6.a).  
- With our proposal, the SAAB is described by 
{11, 192.0.2.64/26, ESP}, and the SABA is 
described by {4, 192.0.1.64/26}, ESP}. See 
Fig.6.b). 
The advantage of our approach is that both 
terminals could change their IP address as many times 
as needed (but always inside the specified range) within 
the same IPSec tunnel (keeping the same SA) without 
producing a security problem. 
Security Parameter Index (SPI) 
Security Protocol 
Transport Protocol 
Source IP address 
Destination IP address 
Source Port 
Destination Port 
….. 
Figure 5. A Security Association with linked lists of 
IP addresses. Each IP address stores a poiner to the 
next IP address. 
Figure 6. Example of SA. a) Using the approach from 
[9]; b) Using our proposal. 
For instance, assume that there is a terminal A in 
network 192.0.1.64/26 communicating with two 
equipments, B1 and B2, in network 192.0.2.64/26 (see 
Fig. 7). Then, the SAD in A has two entries, one for 
transmission A→B1 and one for transmission A→B2. 
The SAAB1 is defined by {11, 192.0.2.64/26, ESP} and 
SAAB2 is defined by {12, 192.0.2.64/26, ESP}. The 
SAD in B1 has just one SA defined by {4, 
192.0.1.64/26, ESP}; likewise, the SAD in B2 has just 
one SA defined by {4, 192.0.1.64/26, ESP}. Observe 
that SPI are unique locally, i.e., only within the same 
security association database. In this case, we suppose 
the SPI is repeated in B1 and B2, but they could be 
different. Assume an IP packet protected with the 
SAAB1 is sent (maliciously) to B2. This equipment is 
IPSec 
192.0.1.65/24 
195.0.1.66/24 
192.0.2.65/24 
195.0.2.66/24 
SAD A 
SAAB {11, {192.0.2.65, 192.0.2.66}, 
ESP} 
SAD B 
SABA {4, {192.0.1.65, 192.0.1.66}, 
ESP } 
a) 
SAD A 
SAAB { 11, 192.0.2.64/26, ESP} 
SAD B 
SABA { 4, 192.0.1.64/26, ESP} 
b) 
A B 
Secure communication: IP packets 
IPs1 
IPs2 
IPs3 
IPd1 
Security Association
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going to find an entry in the SAD, since the SAB2A has 
the same SPI (equal to 4) as SAB1A, the same origin IP 
(192.0.1.64/26), and same security protocol (ESP). 
However, the security parameters (keys for 
authentication, keys for encryption, and maybe even 
algorithms to authenticate and encrypt) for SAB2A are 
different from the security parameters for SAB1A. 
Therefore, we do not incur a security threat by the fact 
of using a range of IP addresses instead of unique IP 
addresses to identify a security association. 
In addition, suppose there are two WLAN whose 
coverage overlaps with UMTS coverage. Using the 
proposal from [9] (Fig. 8.a), it would be required to 
include in both, SA1 and SA2, all individual available 
IP addresses that users can employ for this 
communication. With our improvement (Fig. 8.b), if IP 
addresses used within UMTS cell1 were in the same 
range as those used in WLAN1 (not necessarily in the 
same network), users could move freely from WLAN1 
to UMTS cell1, changing IP addresses if needed but 
using the same SA. The same applies if communication 
is established between a UMTS cell and an overlapped 
WLAN. In this last case, vertical handover with SCTP 
could be done faster in a secure way by using our 
compatible version of IPSec. Clearly, in any of the 
examples shown before, the processing time required to 
check if an IP address belongs to the SA in use is 
reduced with our approach. 
Figure 7. Example of two communications with 
same origin and different destination. 
3.2. Implementation and experimental tests 
In order to support our proposal, some 
straightforward changes should be done. Observe that 
to develop this IPSec implementation it is necessary to 
modify the common structure and processing of SA, 
and the IKE protocol behavior. 
Regarding the first part, structure and processing of 
SA, our approach incorporates a very simple method, 
not used so far, to store feasible IP addresses within a 
SA: a pair [IP address, netmask] represented in Fig. 9. 
As well as decreasing processing time, the SAD size is 
also reduced. This is the system incorporated in our 
IPSec implementation, with a completely satisfactory 
result tested by experimentation. 
Concerning IKE, all IP addresses that are likely to 
be used have to be known by the other communication 
endpoint. We propose that this exchange could be done 
during the negotiation of the SA for IPSec. Notice that 
this exchanged is secure thanks to the security 
association of ISAKMP. More specifically, our 
implementation includes these likely IP addresses in 
the Identity payload (Fig. 4) of the ISAKMP messages 
that are exchange in the second ISAKMP phase. 
Observe that addresses are specified as pairs [IP 
address, netmask]. 
a) 
b) 
Figure 8. Example of the advantages of SCTP 
multihoming and IPSec. 
Internet 
WLAN1 coverage 
UMTS 
coverage 1 
WLAN2 coverage 
UMTS 
coverage 2 
Pool 192.0.1.64/26 
Pool 192.0.1.128/26
Pool 192.0.2.64/26 
Pool 192.0.2.128/26
SA1 = SPI1; all individual allowed destination IP addresses; 
security parameters 
SA2 = SPI2; all individual allowed destination IP addresses; 
security parameters 
SA1 
SA2 
SA1 = SPI1; pools of destination IP addresses; security 
parameters 
SA2 = SPI2, pools of destination IP addresses; security 
parameters 
SA1 
SA2 
IPSec 
Secure communication: IP packets 
192.0.1.65/24 
195.0.1.66/24 
192.0.2.65/24 
195.0.2.66/24 
SAD A 
SAAB1 {11, 192.0.2.64/26, ESP} 
SAAB2 {12, 192.0.2.64/26, ESP}} 
SAD B1 
SAB1A {4, 192.0.1.64/26, ESP} 
SAD B2 
SAB2A {4, 192.0.1.64/26, ESP} 
192.0.2.67/24 
195.0.2.68/24 
A 
B1 
B2 
Secure communication: IP packets 
IPSec 
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SPI 
Security Protocol 
Transport Protocol 
Source IP address 
Destination IP address 
Source Port 
Destination Port 
….. 
Figure 9. A Security Association with linked lists of 
pairs [network, mask]. To store a unique IP address, 
just set the proper netmask. 
Our IPSec implementation, written in C code, was 
designed to operate in the user memory zone of a Linux 
terminal (SuSe 10). This IPSec implementation 
employs raw sockets to send messages, and the 
Libpcap library to receive messages. 
Raw sockets are not linked to any transport port, so 
they can send raw data. With raw sockets, the 
programmer can create the IP header so that the Kernel 
only adds the network layer (e.g. Ethernet). Using raw 
sockets to receive data was not useful, because the IP 
header is automatically discarded. Moreover, all traffic 
would be received by the PC running our 
implementation regardless the destination inside the 
PC. For this reason, we employ Libpcap functions in 
reception, since they include filters that operate at 
Kernel level. 
Tests were conducted in the topology depicted in 
Fig. 10. This topology comprises one laptop as a SCTP 
client with two network interfaces, and three PCs: a 
SCTP server, Router1, and Router2. The laptop and the 
PCs have Linux operating system. The SCTP client has 
two IP addresses available, 192.168.2.1 (wireless) as 
primary address and 192.168.3.1 (wired) as secondary 
address, therefore being able to use the multihoming 
capability. The SCTP client downloads several files 
from the SCTP server, using the same SCTP 
connection (this application was developed by the 
authors in a previous work). 
In this scenario, we use IPSec to establish a secure 
tunnel between the SCTP client and Router2. The 
tunnel is represented in Fig. 10 with a gray area. The 
SA from Router2 to the SCTP client includes the pairs 
192.168.2.0/ 255.255.255.0 and 192.168.3.0/ 
255.255.255.0 as addresses to be protected with the 
same security parameters. 
To verify the goodness of our IPSec implementation 
efficiently compatible with SCTP, we force a failure in 
the SCTP client’s network adapter with IP address 
192.168.2.1 (primary address). The SCTP client sets 
then its secondary IP address (192.168.3.1) as the 
active one. After this change, a regular IPSec 
implementation would disable the tunnel, and it would 
require a new negotiation of IPSec tunnel parameters 
before setting the tunnel again. With our IPSec 
implementation, the same IPSec tunnel is kept giving 
an uninterrupted security service to the SCTP 
connection. As an example, Fig. 11 shows a traffic 
capture made with Wireshark [14] during the tests, 
where we can observe that after changing the IP 
address, the SPI of the IPSec tunnel is the same. 
Several configurations for the IPSec tunnel were tested 
in this scenario (AH plus ESP with and without 
authentication, DES or 3DES, etc.), all reporting 
successful results. 
Figure 10. Topology for tests. The gray area 
represents the path protected by our IPSec 
implementation. Solid line is a wireline connection, 
and the dotted line is a wireless connection. 
SPI 0x80300000 
Security Protocol ESP+authentication 
Transport Protocol SCTP 
Source IP address 192.168.1.1/32 
Destination IP address 
192.168.2.0/24 
192.168.3.0/24 
Source Port Source Port 
Destination Port Destination Port 
a) 
b) 
Figure 11. a) Data stored in a Security Association 
within our enhanced IPSec. b) Traffic capture during a 
network failure: the primary IP address becomes 
inactive. SCTP connection uses the secondary IP 
address. The IPSec tunnel is the same even with the 
change of IP addresses in use. 
SCTP client 
SCTP server 
192.168.1.1/24 192.168.1.254/24 
192.168.5.254/24 
192.168.5.253/24 
192.168.2.254/24 
192.168.3.254/24 
192.168.2.1/24 
192.168.3.1/24 
nets1/masks1 
Security Association
nets2/masks2 
nets3/masks3 
netd1/maskd1 
Router2
Router1
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4. Conclusion and further work 
In this work, we present an enhanced IPSec 
implementation able to efficiently work with 
multihoming SCTP. In order to do so, we have 
redesigned the SA used by IPSec so that they can store 
several IP addresses, either single or [network, mask] 
pairs. This latter option significantly improves the 
performance compared with the use of multiple single 
IP addresses. From a qualitative point of view, the time 
needed by the SAD to check if an alternative source or 
destination IP address belongs to the same SA is 
smaller if checking is done by sets of IP addresses 
rather than by individual ones. In addition, the IPSec 
tunnel can be kept if the user uses an IP address from a 
predefined pool of addresses, without the need of 
exactly specifying what the IP addresses in use are. 
Despite the conceptual simplicity of our approach, it 
has not been proposed before in related literature about 
IPSec or SCTP security. Currently, we are working 
towards a solution to allow IPSec and SCTP with 
dynamic address reconfiguration. 
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